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abstRact
We run a classroom experiment on oligopoly with students enrolled on basic and medium level microecono-
mics courses. Students compete in a symmetric quantity setting environment. The experiment runs over an 
entire academic semester and is divided into 20 one-week rounds. We want to explore whether the effect of 
knowledge and social interaction between players modifies the cooperative and competitive behavior obser-
ved in similar experiments run in a lab. Our hypothesis is that players are socially influenced. Hence, indivi-
duals adjust behavior in a dynamic way aimed at maximizing profits, but also according to social pressures. 
Overall, we obtain different learning processes across academic levels and also slightly different behavior 
from that predicted by economic theory. We argue that students’ utility function depends not only on profit 
levels but also on social relationships. Moreover, we believe that the effect of reputation plays an important 
role in our framework.
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ResuMen
Hemos llevado a cabo un experimento oligopolístico en el aula con estudiantes pertenecientes a los niveles 
básico y medio de la asignatura de microeconomía. Los estudiantes compitieron en un mercado donde todos 
tenían la misma función de costes ofreciendo cantidades de un bien en cada ronda. El experimento tuvo lugar 
durante un semestre académico completo y fue dividido en 20 rondas de una semana. Se quiere investigar si 
el efecto del aprendizaje y de la interacción social entre los jugadores modifica el comportamiento competitivo 
y cooperativo observado en experimentos similares llevados a cabo en un laboratorio. Nuestra hipótesis es 
que los jugadores están socialmente influenciados. Así pues, los individuos adecúan su comportamiento 
dinámicamente con el objetivo de maximizar beneficios pero también en concordancia con las presiones 
sociales. En general, se han observado diferentes procesos de aprendizaje por niveles académicos así como 
pequeñas diferencias de comportamiento con respecto a las pronosticadas por la teoría económica. Argu-
mentamos que la función de utilidad de los estudiantes depende no sólo de los niveles de beneficio alcan-
zados sino también de las relaciones sociales. Más aún, pensamos que la reputación desempeña un papel 
relevante en el experimento de mercado que se ha llevado a cabo.
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intRoduction
This paper addresses an interesting issue for experimental literature: Does economic 
background modify the behavior of players in an experiment? And also, do players 
behave differently when social interaction is allowed? If this is the case, players’ stra-
tegies should be different from those that arise from a usual maximizing-profits game. 
Moreover, the learning processes towards standardized economic equilibria could be 
different. To highlight these issues we perform an economic experiment that takes place 
outside the computer lab. Most oligopoly experiments are run on computers (facilitating 
data collection and rapid implementation), but an experiment run manually or, in other 
words, by allowing real interaction between players in (and outside) class is interes-
ting for a number of reasons. First, it is appealing for instructional purposes. Second, it 
gives us the opportunity to test how social concerns may influence economic strategies. 
Moreover, this approach has the added values of flexibility and not being dependent on 
the availability of computer rooms.
 We run an oligopoly experiment with basic and medium level microeconomics stu-
dents. A number of experimental subjects (players) play a game in which they compete 
in a symmetric quantity setting environment. The market is open for a whole semester 
divided into 20 rounds (one per week). In each background level players are divided 
into 7 markets of 10 players each. Thus, 140 students play the classroom experiment. 
Players decide their output at any time from Monday to Friday: There is no requirement 
to choose a strategy at any particular time over these five days. Under this environment, 
players can cheat each other before the strategy is chosen. Hence, it is possible for 
players to take into account not only economic information but also sociological con-
cerns that may modify the final output decision. Moreover, we are interested in checking 
whether the concepts of adaptive learning and imitation are crucial in explaining the path 
towards equilibria in each economic background and across rounds. Our hypothesis is 
that sociological concerns are important and that, accordingly, players maximize a more 
general utility function which depends not only on profit-maximizing behavior but also 
on social pressures imposed by the group. We want to explore whether the effect of 
knowledge and the incentives to behave either competitively or cooperatively provide 
different market outcomes across different background levels and outcomes different 
from those predicted by economic theory. If players are influenced by social pressures, 
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they adjust their behavior in a dynamic way accordingly. A consistent observation across 
markets is that neither best response dynamics nor partial adjustment to best response 
fully explains output fluctuations.
 Literature on oligopoly experiments is abundant, and provides different conclusions 
depending on the assumptions made. An important issue is whether information about 
successful strategies of rivals may influence the learning process or, on the contrary, 
players follow an adaptive learning process to converge at any long run outcome. On 
one hand, Vega-Redondo (1997) points out that an evolutionary process in which firms 
can imitate their rivals’ strategies yields convergence to the competitive equilibrium in 
a symmetric environment. On the other hand, Milgrom and Roberts (1991) propose a 
general setting known as adaptive learning to study dynamic interaction of subjects. 
Many papers have followed the latter approach to test the theoretical predictions of oli-
gopoly models. Rassenti et al (2000) analyze some versions of Milgrom and Roberts’ 
setting. In particular they study (i) best response dynamics; and (ii) partial adjustment 
to best response. In that paper experimental subjects play an asymmetric game. They 
seek to explore whether a repeated play by privately informed subjects converges to a 
unique, static, noncooperative Nash-Cournot equilibrium. It is found that this repeated 
interaction partially converges. Moreover, total output averaged over time periods and 
across experiments is greater than the predicted equilibrium total output. In our setting, 
we find that in both economic backgrounds players sooner or later converge to the pre-
dicted Walrasian output. A similar approach to Rassenti et al is found in Van Huyck et al 
(1990; 1994) but in these papers they attempt to select an equilibrium when there are 
multiple equilibria under homogeneous subjects. Huck et al (1999; 2000) test various 
learning theories in the context of a Cournot oligopoly by varying the information given 
to subjects. A crucial assumption here is that the learning and decision adjustment 
processes depend only on aggregate output of rivals in previous periods. The results 
show that some subjects imitate successful behavior if they have the necessary infor-
mation, and if they do so then markets are more competitive. Other subjects follow a 
best reply process.
 More recently, in Apesteguia et al (2007) a generalized theoretical approach is intro-
duced to study imitation by testing different theories in a laboratory experiment by sys-
tematically varying information conditions. In their theoretical analysis they find that the 
predictions of previous imitation models are mainly explained by different information 
assumptions and to a lesser extent by different behavioral rules. Overall, the data pro-
vide evidence of imitation at individual level; moreover, individuals’ propensity to imitate 
more successful actions is increasing in payoff differences. Apesteguia (2010) also tests 
the well-known result by Vega-Redondo (1997) that implies that imitation leads to the 
Walrasian outcome in symmetric Cournot oligopolies. This is exactly what our results 
show under Treatment I, in which there is no incentive to behave cooperatively. Apeste-
guia (2010) also shows that this result is not robust to the slightest asymmetry in costs 
and suggests a new theory based on a mix of imitation and other learning processes to 
explain the behavior of subjects better.
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 Social conflicts are also relevant in economic experiments. In our context, Treatment 
II allows for cooperative behavior by groups but also for individual profit-maximizing 
behavior. Thus, the subject has to balance these two opposite pressures in order to maxi-
mize his/her utility function. Our Treatment II is also related to group selection models. 
These models were developed in biology (Wilson, 1983), and some economic applica-
tions are outlined by Vega-Redondo (1993) and Sjostrom et al. (1996). In group selection 
models, populations are fragmented into locally isolated groups with independent evolu-
tions, corresponding to our markets. Within each group, there is some kind of individual 
selection or competition, but there is also selection or competition between groups. Thus, 
more efficient groups have an advantage over less efficient groups. The basic result is 
that group selection may outweigh the effect of individual selection. A similar result is 
found in our environment: it is better to promote internal cooperation than maximize indi-
vidual profits when groups compete with one another. Along these lines, Blackwell (2003) 
reports on the results of a series of experiments designed to investigate the role of pre-
ferences on individual willingness to contribute to the provision of a group (excludable) 
versus a global (non-excludable) public good. Results show that when the average per 
capita return to society of the global public good exceeds the average per capita return 
to society of the group public good, individuals contribute more to the global good but 
do not reduce their contributions to the group public good. Choi (2007) investigates how 
altruism -benefiting fellow group members at a cost to oneself- and parochialism -hostility 
toward individuals not of one’s own ethnic, racial, or other group- are common human 
behaviors. The intersection of the two, in his words parochial altruism, is puzzling from an 
evolutionary perspective because altruistic or parochial behavior reduces one’s payoffs 
by comparison to what one would gain by eschewing these behaviors. But parochial 
altruism could evolve if parochialism promoted intergroup hostilities and the combination 
of altruism and parochialism contributed to success in those conflicts.1
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents economic theory 
predictions that arise in our environment. Section 3 defines the experimental environ-
ment. Section 4 shows and analyzes the results of the experiment. Section 5 concludes.
wHat econoMic tHeoRy says
We run an experimental oligopoly comprising 10 players in each market. Players com-
pete on quantities. Hence, each subject decides an amount of output in each trading 
round. The number of trading rounds is 20 and this is commonly known. Linear market 
demand is assumed with an inverse function, 
 1 His game-theoretic analysis and agent-based simulations show that under conditions likely to have been expe-
rienced by late Pleistocene and early Holocene humans, neither parochialism nor altruism would have been viable 
singly, but by promoting group conflict, they could have evolved jointly.
  
€
P(qit ,q−it ) =1000 − (qit + 1 ʹ′q−it )	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where P is the market price determined as a function of the total output, 
1΄ is a vector of dimension 1x9,       is the output of player i at round t, and        is a 
vector which includes all output levels but  i, in round t. We study a homogeneous mul-
tiperiod Cournot market. There are ten symmetric firms in each market at each level 
—basic and intermediate— (7 markets per level). Quantities could be chosen from a 
finite grid between 0 and 100 with 0.01 as the smallest step. The cost function for each 
economic subject is,
 
We assume a linear-quadratic cost function because it represents a large penalization 
as long as output increases. Thus, production and output levels close to the maximum 
capacity for a given subject i not only decrease the market price but also raise costs. As 
a result, the damage to profits is significant and subjects must take these two effects into 
account. By contrast, when costs are linear there is no reason to produce a low quantity 
and strategic interaction does not enhance the learning effect.
 Below, we report the Nash-Cournot equilibrium, the Walrasian behavior (perfect com-
petition) and the most cooperative equilibrium. We also include the eventual output in the 
case that a subject deviates from the most cooperative equilibrium.
 When firms behave as Cournot competitors they maximize, 
 
The Walrasian equilibrium holds when all ten firms take the price as given, so that they 
decide the amount of output to produce as a result of their cost structure. Notice that 
despite of firms maximize profits there is no strategic interaction from a game-theory 
point of view. Thus, 
 
The most collusive outcome (the monopoly outcome) is found when firms maximize joint 
profits (alternatively when they minimize total industry costs), 
where                     is a vector which comprises the cost functions except for firm i. 
€ 
Ci(qit ) =
qit2
2 +100qit + 50
€ 
qit
€ 
q−it 	  
  
€ 
max
qit
P(qit , q− it )(qit + 1ʹ′q−it ) −Ci(qi) − 1ʹ′C− i(q− it )
€ 
q−it 	  Q =      + 1΄
€ 
qit
€ 
max
qit
P(qit , q−it )qit −Ci(qit )
€ 
max
qit
P⋅ qit −Ci(qit ) 	  
  
€ 
max
qit
P(qit ,q−it )(qit + 1ʹ′q− it ) −Ci(qit ) − 1ʹ′C−i(q− it )
RIS, VOL. 70. EXTRA 1, 167-187, MARZO 2012. ISSN: 0034-9712  DOI 10.3989/rIS.2011.07.14
172 • JOSÉ A. GARCÍA-MARTÍNEZ, CARLOS GUTIÉRREZ-HITA and JOAQUÍN SÁNCHEZ-SORIANO
 Finally, if a given firm deviates, by taking the static optimal best response, 
evaluated at the most collusive output fixed by the others q*-it an optimal deviation stra-
tegy is found. Table 1 reports theoretic equilibrium values arising from our particular envi-
ronment. πit stands for profits earned by player i at round t .
Table 1. 
Theoretical equilibria
Walras Nash-Cournot Collusion Deviation
81.81 75 42.85 100.00
818.1 750 428.5 485.65
181.9 250 571.5 514.35
3,297.09 8,387.5 19,235.7 36,378.0
The next section explores the strategic interaction that arises when the classroom expe-
riment is run.
exPeRiMental enviRonMent
An oligopoly experiment is run with basic and medium level microeconomics students, refe-
rred to hereafter as Background I and Background II, respectively. A number of players 
compete in a symmetric quantity setting environment. They interact 20 times in the course 
of a whole semester (once a week), in two different treatments of 10 times each. In each 
background level players are divided into 7 markets of 10 players each. Each trading round 
comprises five days per week, from 00.00 on Monday to 23.59 on Friday. Thus, players 
decide their output at any time from Monday to Friday: There is no requirement to choose a 
strategy at any particular time over these five days. By opening the market for five days we 
get a long time horizon in which subjects can interact and behave according to profit-orien-
ted decisions but also to reputation/social concerns. Moreover, as some learning processes 
may take quite some time to converge (if they do so at all) we need enough trading phases. 
Under this environment, players can cheat one another prior to choosing their strategies. 
Hence, it is possible for players to take into account not only economic information but also 
sociological concerns that may modify the final output decision.
= Ri (q -it) 
€ 
qit
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 We run two types of experiment, which we refer to as Treatment I and Treatment 
II. Each is run for 10 rounds and players are fully informed (it is a show experiment): 
they know at the end of each round the strategies played by the rest of subjects, market 
prices, total output of the markets and firms’ profits. This information is accumulated over 
the trials. Under this environment we want to test whether economic background signifi-
cantly influences the behavior of players and also see what effect social interaction has 
on the choices of rivals.
Treatment I
Under this environment players take into account the profits obtained by their competitors 
in their market. The profits of each player in each round are accumulated so that at the 
end of the first ten rounds a final ranking is formed for each market. Thus, seven rankings 
are obtained for each background. Under this environment, a given player only needs to 
take into account the profits obtained by the other members of his/her own market. The 
payoff of a given player depends solely on what happens within his/her market. Within 
each market and on each level players are paid as follows: The best result is normalized 
to one and the worst is normalized to zero. The rest of the players are ranked by a linear 
combination between zero and one.
Treatment II
This differs from Treatment I in only one way: After ten rounds just one ranking of accu-
mulated profits is formed with all the players from each background, i.e., players in all 
the markets belonging to Background I compete with each other, and the same goes 
for Background II. Thus, two rankings are obtained: One for Background I and another 
for Background II. Under this environment players need to take into account the results 
(profits) obtained by the competitors in their own market but they also compete with the 
rest of the players in markets on their background level.
Payoffs
In each treatment subjects are paid up to 0.5 extra points in their final qualifications. In 
each ranking of profits the winner receives 0.5 extra points and the worst qualified player 
none at all. The remaining payments are assigned following a linear combination bet-
ween the profit of the winner and the profit of the worst qualified player. Under Treatment 
I each market has a winner. Under Treatment II each group of seven markets competes 
on its own economic level, so that there is only one ranking per economic level with only 
one winner in each. As each treatment’s contribution to the final qualification is 1/2, the 
maximum extra score is one.
 Finally, despite the number of players in each market is relatively large compared with 
experiments run on a computer (thus, a player would view his/her choice as not relevant 
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within the overall market process) we think that this is not a challenge in our environment, 
for two reasons. First, the market is open for a long time so information and interaction 
between players reinforce the idea of competition. Second, the cost function is linear-
concave, so larger quantities yield higher production costs. As a result, we argue that 
players may learn in a relatively short number of trials.
Results and analysis
Below, the results of the experiment are decomposed from an aggregate environment 
approximation to a detailed view of market members’ behavior.
Aggregate behavior: static and evolutionary
Table 2 below presents the most general approximation to the results in order to highlight 
the main features that characterize both static and evolutionary group behavior in Back-
grounds I and II.
Table 2.
 Statistical Analysis by Treatment and Group
Treatment I Treatment II
Background Group Average SD
Are agents’ 
SD equal? Average SD
Are agents’ SD 
equal?
A 82.63w   8.54 YES* 72.75n 18.97 YES*
B 92.90w   7.39 YES** 57.83 19.69 YES***
C 82.01w 11.08 YES** 79.18w 15.55 NO
I D 77.24n 15.30 YES*** 59.93 17.45 YES***
E 73.99n 17.37 YES** 79.62w 14.38 NO
F 78.04n,w 13.94 NO 55.98 15.27 YES***
G 73.60n 19.41 YES** 80.65w 11.74 NO
A 78.70   9.36 YES** 53.73 16.29 YES***
B 81.66w 10.78 YES*** 73.68n 18.85 NO
C 80.66w 9.40 YES*** 57.86 21.47 YES*
II D 81.17w 7.08 YES*** 50.34 15.60 YES***
E 81.60w 6.59 YES** 47.27 15.01 YES***
F 80.78w 5.87 YES** 61.23 20.86 YES***
G 80.38w 8.57 NO 53.43 17.53 YES**
w, n and m: There are no statistically significant differences between the mean of the group and the Walrasian 
solution, the Nash-Cournot solution and the monopoly solution, respectively (at 5% significance level). *p-value 
≥ 0.05, **p-value ≥ 0.1, ***p-value ≥ 0.5.
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static beHavioR
We start by analyzing the results from an aggregate and static point of view in order 
to obtain a general view of the behavior of players under the experimental game 
detailed in Section 3. We first observe that there are slight differences between the 
average outputs of Treatment I and the average outputs of Treatment II, and bet-
ween the average outputs of players with a higher-level background in economics 
and those with a lower-level  background (see Table 2). In particular, in Treatment 
I the average outputs of the different groups are close to the Walrasian solution 
(9 out of 14) and to the Nash-Cournot solution (5 out of 14), while in Treatment II 
the predominant average behavior among all groups is not far from the monopolis-
tic solution (9 out of 14). Several groups are also observed with average outputs 
close to the Walrasian solution (3 out 14) and to the Nash-Cournot solution (2 out 
of 14). Therefore, in general, players behave more competitively in Treatment I and 
more cooperatively in Treatment II. One possible explanation for this could be that 
in Treatment I players compete with none another within the group without being 
worried about what is happening in the other groups, while in Treatment II players 
compete within the group but the results obtained by players in other groups affect 
them and they cannot control them. Therefore, there are two level of competition: 
internal and external. Perhaps the existence of rivals outside may lead to more coo-
perative behavior among the players in each group.
 On the other hand, slight differences are also observed between the average 
outputs of the groups when we take into account the economic backgrounds of the 
players. In Treatment I the average outputs among those groups with a higher-level 
background in economics are close to the Walrasian solution (6 out of 7), while among 
those groups with a lower-level background they are equally divided between the Wal-
rasian and Nash-Cournot solutions. In Treatment II the differences in average output 
between the groups with higher and lower-level economic backgrounds are bigger. The 
average output of the groups with higher-level backgrounds is not far from the mono-
polistic solution (6 out of 7), but that of the groups with lower-level backgrounds is more 
variable (3 out of 7 close to the Walrasian solution, 3 out of 7 close to the monopolistic 
solution and 1 out of 7 close to the Nash-Cournot solution). Nevertheless, we observe 
that in almost all cases the average outputs in Treatment I are more competitive than 
in Treatment II.
 Likewise, it is also observed that the variability in the outputs is slightly less in 
Treatment I than in Treatment II. This is because players behave more homogeneously 
in Treatment I than in Treatment II. This may be because in Treatment I players collabo-
rate less with one another, which leads them to vary their offers within a short range of 
potential outputs. However in Treatment II although players collaborate, from time to time 
they drastically deviate in order to obtain competitive gains, thinking about the final result; 
and this behavior leads to a higher variability.
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The last point of interest to be noted in the aggregate and static analysis is that several 
interesting results are observed in the analysis of the variability of the output of the pla-
yers. The first is that in most groups there are no statistically significant differences either 
in Treatment I or in Treatment II between the standard deviations of the variable outputs 
of the players in the same group (see Table 3). This means that in general all players 
belonging to the same group use a similar range of units of production.
evolutionaRy analysis
First, the evolution of the variability of the units produced in each round is analyzed, mea-
sured by their standard deviation. This variability is observed to decrease in the course 
Tabla 3
 Linear trend of the standard deviation along the periods
Treatment I Treatment II
Background Group Correlation coefficient Correlation coefficient
A -0.51   0.90***
B   0.04   0.10
C   0.64*   0.56
I D -0.95***   0.02
E -0.69* -0.39
F -0.71* -0.69*
G -0.07   0.73*
A -0.78** -0.57
B -0.76*   0.67*
C -0.72*   0.44
II D -0.64* -0.59
E -0.70*   0.80**
F -0.23   0.73*
G -0.70*   0.46
*p-value ≤ 0.05, **p-value ≤ 0.01, ***p-value ≤ 0.001.
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of the rounds in Treatment I (negative linear correlation) and increase in the course of 
the rounds in Treatment II (positive linear correlation), as shown in Table 3. This implies 
that players in Treatment I learn from round to round to respond to the strategies of their 
opponents, leading offers by all players to become closer and closer to one another 
and converge to the Walrasian solution. By contrast, in Treatment II it is observed that 
variability increases from round to round: it is argued that players either learn or follow 
strategic behavior. To some extent, players behave more cooperatively in early rounds 
(outputs not far from the monopolistic solution) whereas in the later rounds they deviate 
aggressively in order to protect themselves from the other groups and in order to obtain 
higher revenues in the final result.
 The following two Figures (Figures 1a and 1b) show the aggregate behavior per 
economic level. Thus, for each round there are 70 observations.
 Similar qualitative behavior is observed at both academic levels. In Treatment I the 
main difference is that at the second academic level players behave more aggressively 
from an economic point of view and also learn more rapidly. This means that players can 
be seen to approach standard economic theoretic equilibrium faster than at the first aca-
demic level. This occurs in each group in general. Of course, there are multiple profiles 
depending on the internal relationships and the trend in competition from round to round 
Figure 1a.
Aggregate average behavior. Background I
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within each group. After a sufficient number of rounds all players tend to behave as one 
might expect as a result of repeated economic interaction. We now study these general 
insights in greater detail.
 The pictures above show particular behavior patterns. Picture 1 reports the aggregate 
mean, standard deviation and well-known theoretic equilibria: Walras, Nash-Cournot, 
and perfect collusion (the monopoly outcome). Picture 1(a) plots the aggregate output 
per round of each of the 70 players enrolled in Background I, regardless of what group 
they belong to. Picture 1(b) reports the same statistics and equilibria for Background II. 
In general terms, it is observed that outcomes of players enrolled in Background II on 
average go towards the Walrasian equilibrium faster than those in Background I. This 
occurs in Treatment I (rounds 1 to 10). In Treatment II (rounds 11 to 20) the same profile 
is observed, but now approaching some level of collusion (eventually, perfect collusion). 
In Background I, the average output in the first round is smaller than in the second one, 
and it takes five rounds to converge to the Walras output. However, Background II con-
verges to it in just two rounds. On the other hand, in Treatment II the average output 
of Background I remains around Walras output for two rounds, then starts to decrease 
and finally increases a little. The Background II shows a similar pattern, but it decreases 
sooner and more.
Figure 1b.
Aggregate average behavior. Background II
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 Moreover, standard deviation in Treatment I is lower in Background II. These facts 
reveal that economic know-how may play an active role in determining not only the 
path to either Walras equilibrium or collusion, but also the homogeneity of players when 
they decide their outcomes. Picture 1 also reveals faster learning in Background II. In 
Treatment II perfect collusion is almost achieved in Background II. It is interesting to note 
that in some groups no-one deviates from collusion for a small number of rounds, so the 
monopoly outcome is achieved. By contrast, in Background I collusion is only partial. 
Cheating is observed at both economic levels but cheating from collusive paths is obser-
ved first and to a greater extent in Background II. This may also be caused by economic 
know-how. Finally, at both levels rational behavior is seen to emerge when players play a 
finite-repeated game: incentives to cheat increase as the end of the game approaches.
insigHts PeR econoMic level: a coMPaRison
This subsection examines the behavior of each group within the two levels of econo-
mic background. Figure 2 plots the path followed by groups over the whole experiment. 
Figure 2(a) focuses on Background I and Figure 2(b) plots Background II. Notice that the 
first ten rounds correspond to Treatment I and the last ten rounds to Treatment II. They 
are described below to highlight the behavior described.
Figure 2a.
Average behaviour by markets, Background I
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We focus first on Background I. First, the behavior of the different groups throughout 
Treatment I is compared. It is useful to calculate the average output in each round for 
each group.
 In Treatment I there are two kinds of initial average behavior. Groups A, B and C 
start the experiment with high outputs, in particular two of them around the Walrasian 
output. By contrast groups D, E, F and G start the experiment with low average outputs, 
some of them close to the collusion output. They have a wrong perception of the game. 
In Treatment I, collusion does not offer any advantages. Payoffs depend exclusively on 
the position in the group profit ranking. However, they learn very fast. After four rounds, 
all groups are on average around the Walrasian output, which is the more competitive 
situation. The convergence to the Walrasian output is fairly clear for all groups, and it 
is noticeable how close the average behaviors of the groups are to that output. Some 
groups obtain negative profits for all members in one or two rounds when their outputs 
are too high. For example, group A in R3 and R5, group B in R1, group C in R6, group F 
in R6 and R8 and group G in R6. In all cases the next round has lower output levels with 
positive profits.
 Standard deviation of output in each round and for each group is decreasing in gene-
ral in Treatment I and the differences between them also decrease, with the exception 
of groups G and E, which have one or two players who choose outputs such as 50 even 
close to the last round.
Figure 2b.
Average behaviour by markets, Background II
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 In Treatment II, high levels of output can be observed in all groups in the first round 
(R11). They have not yet learnt that they need to cooperate and that collusion is their best 
chance to get a high position in the global profit ranking. They need some rounds to fully 
understand that a new treatment is working. In the second round (R12), all groups except 
group D are still around the Walrasian output. Group D obtains an average output bet-
ween Nash-Cournot and collusion output. Observation of the player outputs in group D 
reveals that six players choose outputs between 55 and 49. Although they have not been 
taught about oligopoly and collusion and are unable to calculate the collusion output, it 
is clear that they try to collude. However, there are members of group D who still have 
high outputs and consequently get high profits. The following round is more competitive 
for group D and the average output increases to the Nash-Cournot output. After that, 
the average output is decreasing round after round until it almost reaches the collusion 
value. In this group the cooperative players do not change their behavior if any member 
deviates and chooses a higher output. In R18 all members of group D except one choose 
an output of 43.
 In Treatment II the learning process is more complex. Some degree of cooperation 
is needed. Thus, a more heterogeneous behavior from group to group is found. There 
are groups that never try to cooperate, such as groups G and E; surprisingly, these 
groups started Treatment I almost in collusion. In group C, too few players try to collude 
for just a few rounds, and the majority of the group always choose very high outputs. 
In this case, the average goes down to the Nash-Cournot value and then goes up. It 
ends up a little higher than the Walrasian output. Group F colludes after two rounds 
and B after three and then both groups maintain collusion. The winner of Treatment II 
is a member of group B, and he cooperates but deviates three times. Group B is very 
cooperative and not too sensitive to deviations in the sense that cooperators do not 
change their behavior if a player deviates, choosing a high output and getting much 
higher profits than them.
 All members of group A except one collude to 48 after four rounds (R15). There is 
a player who always chooses 81. In R16, there are two players who do not collude. In 
R17, these two are joined by another player who also does not collude. In this round, the 
cooperating members change their output from 48 to 43. They have learnt a better output 
level for collusion. In round 18 there are only three agents producing 43. Eventually, just 
one player chooses 43 the rest have extremely high outputs. In this group, the members 
are sensitive to deviating players. This group would perhaps have been able to collude 
for more rounds if there had not been this one particular player who always chose 81.
 The ranking of the groups by the aggregate profits obtained in Treatment II is: F, D, 
B, A, C, E and G. The standard deviation in this second treatment is more heteroge-
neous. There are some groups, such as F and B, in which collusion is so perfect that the 
standard deviation is zero or very close to zero. In general the standard deviation shows 
greater differences between groups than in Treatment I. The rise and fall of the values 
show the tension between cooperation and deviation. When some players deviate from 
collusion and choose high output levels the standard deviation increases.
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 It is important to point out again that players are anonymous. However sooner or 
later they find out who is who because the experiment lasts twenty weeks. If they know 
each other, the commitment to cooperation is greater. They have to see each other every 
day in the classroom. There is social pressure. At that point, the behavior of a group 
also depends on the relationship between its members. That could explain the different 
behaviors among groups in Treatment II with the same economic background.
 In conclusion, the learning process is faster and more homogeneous among groups 
in Treatment I than in Treatment II because there is no need of cooperation. It is noti-
ceable how fast the groups converge to Walrasian output and how small the difference 
between them is. However, in Treatment II more differences between groups are found. 
Some groups are relatively successful in achieving cooperation, others try but fail, and 
others do not even try to cooperate.
 We now look at Background II group by group. In Treatment I the learning process is 
fairly fast compared with Background I. In Treatment II some markets get almost perfect 
collusive profits. This is the main difference with Background I. However, once some 
degree of collusive profits is achieved, some players deviate from the collusive path in 
early rounds as compared with Background I. However they frequently come back to 
(almost) collusive outcomes. These two observations can be explained by differences in 
economic background but we argue that there is also a sociological effect. As individuals 
have known one another for two academic years instead of one (as in Background I), 
social pressures may be reinforcing cooperative behavior. Overall, 3 types of group can 
be distinguished: First, a group comprising markets A, D, E, and G. Their common feature 
is that they converge under Treatment I to Walras in a small number of rounds and almost 
perfectly. Under Treatment II, they achieve perfect collusion in three rounds. Moreover, 
two profiles can be distinguished within this group. First, groups A and D maintain perfect 
collusion with only a few deviations and finish the game in collusion. By contrast, groups 
E and G break perfect collusion when they approach the end of the game: they finish 
with average outputs above perfect collusion with some players opting for high quantities 
(approaching 100 units of output). These differences can be explained by differences in 
social cohesion within each group. As social relationships between players increase the 
incentives to cheat can be expected to decrease because of subsequent social damage. 
Surprisingly, this occurs although the game is finite.
 The second group comprises markets B and F. In Treatment I they finish at Walras but 
they approach it with some noise (the standard deviation significantly increases in some 
rounds). In Treatment II they approach Nash-Cournot equilibrium with some players offe-
ring monopoly outcomes while others behave competitively by choosing high levels of 
output. Summing up, dispersion is greater than in the first group. This reveals a low level 
of coordination and, perhaps, the existence of various subgroups or a lack of leadership.
The third group comprises market C alone. This market approaches Walras with noise in 
Treatment I and also tries to collude in Treatment II, achieving some degree of collusion 
but with a high dispersion of players’ outcomes. Under both treatments in this market 
agents behave heterogeneously, drawing a random output path over the 20 rounds.
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 To highlight the most important observations, consider the market that fits the theory 
best and that which fits it worst. Market D behaves in accordance with economic theory 
in both treatments. Players can be seen to converge to a Walras equilibrium in Treatment 
I with a lower dispersion as the number of rounds increase (as standard deviation indi-
cates). In particular, the mean is between 70 and 90 units of output around Treatment 
I. By round 3 of Treatment II they converge to perfect collusive behavior with only one 
deviation in round 5. This group finishes Treatment II in perfect collusion, which reveals 
a great social cohesion or sufficient social pressure to prevent players from cheating on 
the cartel agreement. It is noticeable that such behavior occurs only in Background II. By 
contrast market F is more eclectic. Under Treatment I its behavior is quite similar to the 
rest of the groups, except for some erratic outcomes in the middle rounds; in Treatment 
II it proves to have extremely low levels of coordination. From rounds 3 to 5 players 
approach almost perfect collusion but from round 6 onwards many players cheat by 
choosing higher outcomes. It seems that economic know-how prevents this group from 
obtaining negative profits; thus, it approaches the Nash-Cournot outcome instead of the 
Walras outcome.
conclusions
The main findings of this experimental study can be summed up as follows. Taken alone, 
the most aggregate average outputs of each market (see Table 2) in general are not far 
from the Nash-Cournot, Walrasian and monopolistic solutions. This is observed especia-
lly for the cases of the Walrasian and Nash solutions (see Table 2). This is because the 
monopolistic solution is more sensitive to the unilateral deviation of players, for two basic 
reasons: First, it is difficult to get the whole group to agree to behave collusively. Second, 
even if such an agreement is achieved it is difficult to maintain over time, taking into 
account that players also face a situation with a finite horizon, which favors the deviation 
of players in the last rounds of the game.
 Competitive behavior is detected in Treatment I and collusive behavior in Treatment 
II. This is because in Treatment I there is only internal competition, while in Treatment II 
there is both internal and external competition. The external competition is an externality 
which provokes a collaborative reaction in the members of a group in order to defend 
themselves against external competitors.
 There are differences between average outputs depending on the background in 
economics. The students with Background II have already undergone part of the learning 
process before the experiment starts. We observe that players learn throughout the ten 
rounds in Treatment I. The variability in players’ outputs decreases over the ten rounds, 
which implies that players converge more or less to the same output. This in turn means 
that there is an action-reaction effect which favors the learning of players, leading (in the 
long term) towards an equilibrium solution. We also observe that players behave strategi-
cally in Treatment II, because the variability of the outputs increases over the ten rounds. 
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This, in some sense, implies that the players collude at the beginning and deviate in the 
last rounds to obtain a competitive advantage for the final result.
 When the data are observed in greater detail (see Pictures 2(a) and 2(b)) the evo-
lution of the average outcome of each market in each round emerges. In Treatment I 
markets converge to the Walrasian solution faster in Background II than in Background 
I. In Background I, some groups start Treatment I with collusive behavior but in a few 
rounds they are close to Walrasian output. It is noticeable how fast the groups converge 
to Walrasian output and how little difference there is between them. In Treatment II the 
learning process is more complex. They need some degree of cooperation. Thus, more 
heterogeneous behavior is found among groups. Some groups are relatively successful 
in achieving cooperation, others try to cooperate but fail, and others do not even try. 
The students from Background II are in general more successful in cooperating than the 
students from Background I. This may imply that their level of knowledge influences the 
behavior of players. We also argue that the effect of social pressures is more evident in 
Background II: cooperative behavior is more likely to occur, but players also come back 
to the group discipline in only one round in the event of deviations. The present expe-
riment provides new insights and suggests that results from lab experiments should be 
checked in a more open environment where players can interact with one another.
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aPPendix
instRuctions foR students2
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision-making. There are 7 indepen-
dent markets known as A, B, C, D, E, F, and G.
 In this experiment you will participate in the B-market, in which you will be producing 
and selling units of a fictitious good. In this B-market, there will be 10 producers and you will 
be known as producer B5. You are free to produce and sell as many units as you wish in the 
interval, q ∈ (0,100), where q is the level of output that you produce. All the output produced 
will be sold. However, the more that is produced the less will be paid per unit of output.
 This experiment is divided into two treatments of 10 rounds each. A round takes a week. 
You must select the quantity of the good that you will produce and send it by E-mail before 
the weekend. You are free to change your output/sales quantity once each week. For exam-
ple, if you choose to produce 50 units, you must send B5-50 any day from Monday to Friday 
(inclusive). Each other producer from the B-market will also make a quantity decision. Q is 
the sum of the quantities chosen by all other producers in the B-market. The total quantity 
offered for sale (and bought by the buyers) each week is therefore q + Q  .
 The inverse demand function of your B-market is in any round:
 Your cost function is in any round:
 Therefore, your profit function is in any round.
 For example, if the outputs of a week are:
 2 The instructions reproduced here are those given to the student labeled B5 in market 5. Each student 
received the same instructions: only the market and the player number are changed. 
€ 
P(q,Q ) =1000 − (q +Q ),
€ 
C(q) = q
2
2 +100q + 50
€ 
Π(q,Q) = P(q,Q)q −C(q) = (1000 − (q +Q))q − (q
2
2 +100q + 50) 	  
€ 
B1 = 50;B2 = 24;B3 = 56;B4 = 67;B5 = 34;
B6 = 68;B7 = 56;B8 = 90;B9 =15;B10 = 21
Q = 50 + 24 + 56 + 67 + 34 + 68 + 56 + 90 +15 + 21 = 481
Price : P(q,Q ) =1000 − (q +Q ) =1000 − (481) = 519
Profits of producer B5 : Π(q,Q ) = (519)34 − ( 34
2
2 +100(34) + 50) =13618
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All producers in all markets have the same costs and face the same market demand 
function, so the profit function is the same across players and markets. At the end of the 
week (after Friday), you will receive an E-mail with the following information about the 
B-market in that week: The weekly outputs of each producer, the sum of all weekly out-
puts, the price of the good per unit in that week, the weekly profit made by each producer, 
and the accumulated profits that you and the others producers have earned up to this 
round. In each round you can choose either the same output as in the previous round or 
a different one.
 After 10 weeks, a ranking of your market (B-market) will be drawn up, with the accu-
mulated profits. Your reward for participating in this first stage will depend on that ranking. 
The seller from your market with the highest accumulated profit (called              ) will get 
0.5 extra points in the final mark. On the other hand, the seller from your market which 
the lowest accumulate profit (called              ) will get zero extra point in the final mark. If 
you get an accumulate profit between them, you note will depend linearly on the distance 
to both extremes according to the following function where       is your accumulate profits:
After 10 weeks a new stage will start. You will receive information about the functioning 
of the experimental game at the beginning of round 11.
second tReatMent
There is only one difference with Treatment I. After 10 rounds (for rounds 11 to 20) just 
one ranking will be drawn up with the accumulated profits of all the producers from the 
seven markets. Your reward for participating in this treatment will depend on that ranking. 
The seller with the highest accumulated profit (called             ) will get 0.5 extra point in 
the final mark. On the other hand, the seller which the lowest accumulate profit 
(called               ) will get zero extra points in his/her final mark. If your accumulated profit 
is between the two, your mark will depend linearly on your distance from both extremes 
according to the following function, where      is your accumulated profit:
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